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TAXATION OF INCOME OF DECEDENTS
George Craven t
The federal income tax statute dealing with income in respect of
decedents 1 has been in force for eleven years, and during that period
the courts have solved many of the income tax problems arising under
that statute as well as companion problems arising under the estate
tax statute. As an aid to understanding the purpose and meaning
of the income tax statute, it is helpful to review the considerations
which gave rise to its enactment.
TREATMENT PRIOR TO 1942 OF INCOME ACCRUED AT DEATH
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1934, if an individual filed his fed-
eral income tax returns on a cash basis, income which had accrued
to him but was uncollected at the time of his death was not taxable
to the decedent, because it had not been received by him. It was
subject to estate tax as an asset of his estate, and it was held to be
corpus and not income to the estate and therefore not subject to
income tax to the estate2  The result was that the income escaped
income tax entirely.
The Revenue Act of 1934 provided for the first time for including
in the final return of a cash basis decedent amounts of income accrued
but uncollected at the time of death.' Similarly, that Act allowed
as deductions in such decedent's final income tax return items other-
wise deductible which had accrued but were unpaid at the time of his
death.4 Those provisions remained in force until the enactment of
the Revenue Act of 1942.
The statute as amended in 1934 was found to operate inequitably
against decedents. Although it was designed merely to prevent ac-
crued income from escaping income tax and to allow certain deduc-
tions accrued at death,5 the statute as construed by the courts in cer-
j- A.B., LL.B., Mercer University; Member of Georgia, Florida, New York and
Pennsylvania Bars.
1. INT. REv. CODE § 126, as added by the Revenue Act of 1942, § 134, 56 STAT.
830 (1942).
2. Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 241 (1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 584
(1928); William G. Frank, 6 B.T.A. 1071 (1927); G.C.M. 8826, IX-2 Cum. BULL.
194 (1930).
3. Revenue Act of 1934, § 42, 48 STAT. 694 (1934).
4. Revenue Act of 1934, § 43, 48 STAT. 694 (1934).
5. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934) ; SEN. REP. No. 558, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934). See Helvering v. Enright, 312 U.S. 636, 639 (1941).
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tain cases caused large amounts to be taxed in a decedent's final return.
For example, in Helvering v. Enright,' involving the final income
tax return of a deceased member of a law firm, it was held that
the return should include not only the decedent's share of legal fees
accrued to the partnership in an accounting sense, but also his esti-
mated share of fees which the firm had earned on uncompleted legal
matters, where it was possible to determine the value of the services
on a quantum meruit basis. It was so held even though the partner-
ship was on a cash basis. The court said: "Accruals here are to be
construed in furtherance of the intent of Congress to cover into income
the assets of decedents, earned during their life and unreported as in-
come, which on a cash return, would appear in the estate returns." 7
There was a similar decision in a companion case involving a deceased
member of a medical partnership.8 The result in many cases was to
pyramid or "bunch up" in a decedent's final return a large amount
of income, some of which might never be collected by his estate.
On the other hand, where a decedent's estate settled litigation
pending at the time of his death and made a payment which would
have been deductible as a business expense if made by the decedent,
it was held that the amount was not deductible in the decedent's final
return because the amount of the liability was not known or admitted
at the time of death.'
SECTION 126
When the Revenue Bill of 1942 was being considered by Con-
gress, the Treasury Department recommended an amendment to the
income tax law to eliminate the "bunching up" of income in a dece-
dent's final return which resulted from the decision in the Enright
case.10 It was suggested that, in order to avoid this hardship, Congress
abolish the method then in force of taxing such income and that it
substitute a *method which "taxes the income to the persons who ac-
tually receive it," that is, "to the estate or to the heir or legatee as
the case may be." " Congress adopted the changes suggested by the
Treasury Department in order to continue to subject such accrued
6. 312 U.S. 636 (1941).
7. Id. at 644-5.
8. Pfaff v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 646 (1941).
9. Comm'r v. United States Trust Co., 143 F.2d 243 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 727 (1944).
10. See statement of Randolph E. Paul, Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the
Treasury, Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 7378, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1942). See also 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION § 12.100 (Supp. 1953).
11. Hearings, supra note 10.
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income to income tax but to grant relief from hardships resulting in
many cases from including such income in the decedent's final return.1
2
The change suggested by the Treasury Department was accom-
plished by Section 134 of the Revenue Act of 1942, which struck
out the provisions including accrued income and allowing accrued
deductions in the final return of a cash basis decedent 13 and which
added to the Internal Revenue Code a new Section 126, setting forth
the rules for taxing such income.
General Statutory Plan
Section 126 abandons the terms "accrued income" and "accrued
deductions" and uses instead the terms "income in respect of a dece-
dent" and "deductions in respect of a decedent." The pattern of the
statute is to tax such items of gross income, in the year in which they
are actually received, (A) to the decedent's estate, if it acquires from
the decedent the right to such income; (B) if such right is not acquired
by the estate, to the person who acquires such right by reason of the
decedent's death; or (C) if the estate acquires such right from the
decedent and subsequently distributes it to an individual, to such in-
dividual who subsequently receives the income. 4 For example, if
the decedent leaves as part of his general or residuary estate a bond
on which interest of $100 was accrued at the time of death and the
interest is received by his estate after his death, the accrued interest is
taxable as income to the estate. If the bond is bequeathed specifically
to a named legatee, the accrued income is taxable to the legatee in the
year in which received. If the bond forms part of the estate passing to
the executors, and before the interest is received the executors dis-
tribute the bond to a general or residuary legatee, the interest is taxable
to the legatee when received by him.'5
If a right to receive an item of "income in respect of a decedent"
is transferred by sale, exchange or other disposition by the estate or
12. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942); SEN. REP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1942).
13. INT. REV. CODE §§ 42, 43.
14. INT. REv. CODE §126(a) (1).
15. The provisions of § 126 are applicable to years beginning after December 31,
1942. (Revenue Act of 1942, § 134(f), 56 STAT. 832 (1942)). However, in cases
where the decedent's final taxable period began after December 31, 1933, and before
January 1, 1943, an option was afforded to the decedent's personal representative and
the beneficiaries of his estate to elect to have items of income and deductions
accrued at the time of death excluded from the decedent's final return and included
in the returns of the estate or beneficiaries under the provisions of § 126. (Revenue
Act of 1942, § 134(g), 56 STAT. 832 (1942)). Provision was made for the refund
of taxes paid on the decedent's final return in cases where the election was exercised
in the manner prescribed by statute. (Revenue Act of 1942, § 134(g), 56 STAT. 832
(1942)) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.126-4 (1943)). The latest date under the regu-
lations for exercising such election was January 1, 1944. (U.S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§29.126-4(b) (1943)).
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individual who acquires such right from the decedent, there is in-
cludible in the income of the estate or individual in the year in which
the transfer is made the fair market value of such right at the time
of the transfer plus the amount by which any consideration for the
transfer exceeds such fair market value."0 If, then, the right is sold
for an amount in excess of its fair market value, the entire amount
so received will be includible in the gross income of the transferor.
The regulations state that if the right to receive such income is dis-
posed of "by gift or bequest" by the person acquiring the right from
the decedent, the fair market value of the right at the time of such
disposition must be included in the gross income of the donor or
testator.Y However, a distribution of such right by the estate or
trust to a specific legatee or a residuary legatee or by a testamentary
trust to a remainderman is not considered a transfer which causes the
value of the right to be includible in the income of the estate or trust.'
The Commissioner has ruled that where the widow of a deceased
life insurance agent acquired from her husband the right to receive
renewal commissions and she died before receiving the full amount
of the commissions, the value of the uncollected portion was not in-
cludible in her final return. 9 In view of the language of the statute
and regulations, this ruling may be open to question. The result
seems fair, however, and it should be made certain by a clarifying
amendment to the statute.
An amount of income in respect of a decedent is treated in the
hands of the estate or legatee '0 as if it had been acquired in the same
transaction in which the decedent acquired the right to such income,
and it retains in the hands of the estate or legatee the same character,
such as tax exempt income, long-term capital gain or ordinary income,
which it would have had if received by the decedent during his lifetime."'
Certain deductions and credits "in respect of a decedent" are
allowed, in the year of payment, to the decedent's estate, except that
if the estate is not liable to discharge the obligation to which the deduc-
tion or credit relates, the deduction or credit is allowed to the individual
who acquires an interest in property of the decedent subject to such
obligation and who pays the obligation.22 The items so deductible
16. INT. REV. CODE § 126(a) (2).
17. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.126(a)-1(f) (1953).
18. Ibid.
19. See 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAx REP. 6221 (Letter dated Dec. 27, 1951).
20. The term "legatee" is used throughout this article to refer to any person
other than the decedent's estate who, by reason of the death of the decedent, acquires
the right to receive an amount of income in respect of a decedent.
21. INT. REv. CODE § 126(a) (3).
22. INT. REv. CODE § 126(b).
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are limited to those allowable by Section 23 (a), (b) and (c) for busi-
ness and nonbusiness expenses, interest, and taxes, and the credit
is that allowable by Section 31 for foreign taxes on income. For
example, if an heir or devisee acquires directly from the decedent real
property on which taxes had become a lien at the time of death, such
heir or devisee on paying the taxes will be entitled to the same deduc-
tion for such taxes to which the decedent would have been entitled
if he had made the payment during his lifetime. 3 Similarly, if an
individual acquires from the decedent a right to an item of income
on which foreign income taxes must be paid, such individual on pay-
ing the foreign taxes will be entitled to the credit provided for in
Section 31.4
The deduction for depletion under Section 23(m) of the Code
is allowed to the estate or legatee receiving the income to which the
deduction relates." This provision is significant only in the case
of percentage depletion. The deduction for depletion based on cost
or discovery value under Section 114(b) (1) or (2), just like the
deduction for depreciation under Section 23(1), computed to the date
of death is allowable on the decedent's final return, and those who
acquire the property on the decedent's death will compute their deduc-
tion from that date. However, the deduction for percentage depletion
under Section 114(b) (3) is allowable to the person who receives the
income to which the deduction relates, and the regulations state that
the person entitled to such deduction on account of income in respect'
of a decedent is the person who receives the income, whether or not
he receives the property from which such income is derived.26
Deduction for Estate Tax:-Items of "income in respect of a
decedent" to which the decedent had an enforceable right at the time
of his death, being property of the decedent, are subject to estate tax
in his estate as well as to income tax.27 In order to grant partial
relief from this double taxation, the statute allows as an income tax
deduction to the estate or other person entitled to such items of income
a proportionate part of the estate tax attributable to the excess of the
value of the items of accrued income over the items of accrued deduc-
tions which are included in the estate tax return.28 The statute pro-
23. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.126(b)-l(a) (1953).
24. Ibid.
25. INT. REv. CODE §126(b)(2); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.126(b)-l(b)
(1953).
26. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.126(b)-1(b) (1953).
27. INT. REV. CODE § 811 (a).
28. INT. REV. CODE § 126(c).
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vides that the estate tax attributable to such net value, that is, the
excess of income over deductions, "shall be an amount equal to the
excess of the estate tax over the estate tax computed without including
in the gross estate such net value." 29
The estate tax so deductible is the difference between (1) the
federal estate tax, reduced by the credit for state death taxes, as
originally computed and (2) the federal estate tax, reduced by the
credit for state death taxes, recomputed after eliminating the net ac-
cruals from the taxable estate. This means that the allowable deduc-
tion is the federal estate tax at the highest bracket, less the credit for,
state death taxes, on the value of the net accruals subjected to estate
tax. The amount of the estate tax which is allowable as an income
tax deduction each year to the estate or legatee is an amount which
bears the same ratio to the portion of the estate tax attributable to
net accruals which the value for estate tax of the gross accruals re-
ceived by the estate or legatee in that year bears to the total value
for estate tax purposes of all the gross accruals which are subjected
to estate tax. Thus, although the accrued deductions are taken into
consideration in arriving at the net accruals on which estate tax is
payable, the deductions are disregarded in determining the portion of
the estate tax which is deductible each year.
The following example of the determination of the deduction
for estate tax is taken from the regulations: "
An attorney, who was on a cash basis, was entitled to a fee
for services rendered in a case not completed at the time of his death,
which fee was valued in his estate at $1,000, and to accrued interest
on bonds which was valued at $500, making a total of $1,500 which
was included in the gross estate on account of items of income in
respect of a decedent. Deductions were taken on the estate tax return
for $150 of business expenses for which the estate was liable and for
$50 of taxes accrued on property owned by the decedent, making a
total of $200 for accrued deductions. The gross estate was $185,000
and the net estate before taking the specific exemption was $170,000,
on which the total federal estate tax, less the credit for state death
taxes, was $23,625. In the year following the death of the decedent,
his estate collected the legal fee in the amount of $1,200 (valued for
estate tax at $1,000), which amount was included in the income of
the estate. The estate was entitled to a deduction, in computing its
net income for such year, of $260 on account of the estate tax
attributable to such income, which deduction is computed as follows:
29. INT. REv. CoDE §126(c) (2) (C).
30. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.126(c)-1(b) (1953).
1953] TAXATION OF INCOME OF DECEDENTS 191
(a) (1) Value of income in respect of decedent included
in computing gross estate $ 1,500
(2) Deductions in computing gross estate for
claims representing deductions in respect of
decedent $ 200
(3) Net value of income in respect of decedent in-
cluded in gross estate $ 1,300
(b) (1) Federal estate tax less credit for state death
taxes $23,625
(2) Less estate tax computed without including
$1,300 (item (a) (3) above) in gross estate $23,235
(3) Portion of estate tax attributable to $1,300 $ 390
(c) (1) Value in gross estate of income received by
estate in taxable year ($1,200) $ 1,000
(2) Value in gross estate of all items in respect of
decedent $ 1,500
(3) Portion of estate tax deductible on receiving
1,000
$1,200 fee (- x $390) $ 260
1,500
The allowance of a deduction for the estate tax paid on items
which will be subject to income tax to the estate or legatee provides
only partial relief from double taxation. In order to provide complete
relief it would be necessary to allow a credit, rather than a deduction,
for the estate tax. The argument could be made that a deduction,
rather than a credit, is proper because, where a decedent receives income
during lifetime, he is required to pay income tax on such income and
where estate tax is payable on the income, the income tax payable on
the lifetime return is allowable as a deduction and not as a credit on
the estate tax return. However, income received during lifetime is
available for living expenses, and if consumed during lifetime, is not
subject to estate tax. On the other hand, income "in respect of a
decedent" is subjected to estate and income taxes before it is available
to the widow or other beneficiary for living expenses.
The allowance of an income tax deduction for estate tax on income
taxable under Section 126 (a) presents problems to be considered in
drafting a will which makes use of the estate tax marital deduction.
1
31. INT. REv. CoDE §812(e).
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If the right to receive income "in respect of a decedent" is bequeathed
to the surviving spouse and is allowed in whole or in part as an estate
tax marital deduction, a recomputation of the estate tax after eliminat-
ing such income would result in a reduced marital deduction and would
reduce the amount of estate tax otherwise attributable to such income.
The maximum deduction for estate tax on such income can be ob-
tained by providing that the bequest to the surviving spouse shall be
satisfied out of other property of the decedent's estate. But even if
that is done, the recomputation of the estate tax after eliminating the
Section 126 (a) income might reduce the marital deduction by reducing
the adjusted gross estate and thus reduce the amount of estate tax
attributable to such income.
32
Effect of Income Tax on Estate Tax Value:-Although the estate
tax is allowed as a deduction on the income tax return of the estate
or beneficiary, the statute makes no provision for allowing the income
tax payable by the estate or beneficiary as an estate tax deduction or
in reduction of the value at which the accrued income is includible
in the gross estate. It needs no argument that a bond having a market
value of $10,000 is more valuable than accrued income of $10,000 on
which the estate or a legatee must pay income tax of say 40% after
deducting the estate tax, and equitable considerations seem to require
the allowance of the income tax in reduction of the estate tax value.
The estate tax statute states that no deduction shall be allowed for
income tax upon income received after the death of the decedent. 3
However, that provision was included in the statute for the first time
by Section 403 of the Revenue Act of 1918, and the report of the
House Ways and Means Committee on that section shows that the
provision was intended to apply to income earned by the estate during
the period of administration and which was not included in the estate
tax return.3 4 No attempt appears to have been made in the courts
to establish the right to the deductions. This may be because of the
rather definite language of the statute. However, in view of the
clarity of the legislative history, a substantial chance of success could
probably be anticipated. 5
If the income tax should be allowed in reduction of the estate
tax value, then, since the estate tax is deductible on the income tax
32. See 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAx REP. 6162 (Letter dated March 7, 1952).
33. INT. REv. CoD § 812(b).
34. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918), 1939-1 Cum. BuLL.
Part 2 102.
35. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940), in which the Court said that where the plain meaning of words of the legis-
lature "has led to absurd or futile results . . . [the Court] has looked beyond
the words to the purpose of the act."
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return, the amount of each tax would depend on the amount of the
other. The determination of the amount of each tax would require a
mathematical formula similar to that used to compute the amount of
the estate tax deduction for a residuary bequest to charity where the
federal estate tax is payable out of the residue.3" For example,
if the accrued income is $10,000, the applicable estate tax rate 30%
and the applicable income tax rate 40%, it will be found that the
amount of estate tax payable on the accrued income after deducting
the income tax is approximately $2,040, and that the amount of income
tax payable on such income after deducting the estate tax is approxi-
mately $3,180, amounting to total taxes of $5,220. If the estate
tax alone is allowed as a deduction, the estate tax is $3,000, the income
tax is $2,800 and total taxes are $5,800.
Deductions Allowable for either Estate Tax or Income Tax:-
The deductions described in Section 23(a), (b) and (c) which are
accrued and unpaid at death are allowable on the income tax return
of the estate or legatee under Sections 126(b) and 23(w) and also
on the estate tax return of the decedent's estate as claims against the
estate under Section 812(b). There is thus a duplication of the tax
benefit derived from such deductions, although such benefit is lessened
by reason of the fact that the existence of such deductions on the estate
tax return reduces the estate tax on net accruals which is allowable as
an income tax deduction to the estate or legatee.
There are certain expenditures of the estate accruing after death
which may be deducted on either the estate tax return or the income
tax return of the estate, but which may not be deducted on both.
Examples of such items are executors' commissions and investment
expenses, certain attorneys' fees, and state stock transfer taxes, which
are income tax deductions under Section 23(a) and (c) and which
are also deductible on the estate tax return as administration expenses
under Section 812(b). For years prior to the effective date of the
amendment described below, it was held that even though certain
deductions were allowable for estate tax purposes, they were also
allowable as income tax deductions." However, the income tax
statute has been amended by the addition of Section 162(e) of the
Code,3  which provides that amounts deductible on the estate tax
return under Section 812(b) shall not be allowed as income tax de-
ductions under Section 23 (except subsection (w) mentioned above),
unless the estate files within the time and in the manner and form
36. See INT. REv. CODE §812(d).
37. Robert J. Kleberg, 31 B.T.A. 95 (1934) ; Helvering v. Highland, 124 F.2d
556 (4th Cir. 1942). See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942).
38. Added by the Revenue Act of 1942, § 161(a), 56 STAT. 861 (1942), fully
effective for 1942 and subsequent years.
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prescribed by the Commissioner a waiver of the right to such deduc-
tions on the estate tax return. The regulations state that such waiver
"should be filed with the return for the year for which the item is
claimed as a deduction, or with the Commissioner, or with the district
director of internal revenue for the internal revenue district in which
such return was filed, for association with the return." 11
The executor or administrator is thus given the right to elect
whether to claim such deductions on the estate tax return or on the
income tax return of the estate. If he fails to exercise the election
in the manner prescribed by the regulations, the deductions are allow-
able on the estate tax return and not on the income tax return.' If a
proper waiver is filed, the estate may deduct on its income tax return
for a particular year items otherwise allowable on the estate tax return
under Section 812(b) without forfeiting its right to a deduction on
the estate tax return for such administration expenses paid in another
taxable year.
4 '
Right of Estate to Deduct Distributed Income
It was held by the Tax Court in Estate of Ralph R. Huesman,42 and
Rose J. Linde ' that if a decedent's estate receives items of income in
respect of a decedent, it may not take a deduction under Section 162 (c)
of the Code for amounts of such income distributed during the taxable
year to beneficiaries. The reasoning of these cases is that such items
constitute part of the corpus of the estate under the state law, and since
they are not distributed as income under the state law, they may not
be deducted as distributions of income. The Linde case held further
that after the distribution to a legatee of the right to receive an item
of income in respect of a decedent, the income when received was
taxable to the legatee.
The distributee in the Huesman case was a charitable organization
which was entitled to a percentage of the decedent's residuary estate
and was not entitled to receive income. If that decision can be sup-
ported, it is on the ground that an estate cannot take a deduction
under Section 162(c) for a distribution of income to a legatee entitled
to receive only principal. The Tax Court's decision was affirmed on
that ground by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,44 and
39. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.162-1(a) (1953).
40. See Estate of C. M. Sutton, 5 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 213 (1946).
41. I.T. 4048, 1951-1 CuM. BULL. 39, 40.
42. 16 T.C. 656 (1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1952).
43. 17 T.C. 584 (1951).
44. 198 F.2d 133 (1952).
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the appellate court refused to say whether income includible in the
gross income of an estate under Section 126 can in no instance be
deducted as a distribution of income under Section 162.
The Tax Court's decisions in the Huesman and Linde cases are
of doubtful soundness in holding that an estate should be denied a
deduction for a distribution of taxable income merely because such
income is classified as principal under the state law. There is nothing
in Section 126 or Section 162(c) which denies a deduction to the
estate merely because the. distributed income is regarded as principal
under the state law. State law controls in determining whether an
amount is properly distributed by a fiduciary to a beneficiary,45 but
the federal income tax statutes have their own criteria for determining
whether an amount is income, and state law should control on that
question only where the federal taxing statute, by express language
or necessary implication, makes its own operation dependent upon
state law.48 Moreover, the statute governing income in respect of a
decedent provides expressly that such income shall have the same
character in the hands of the estate or legatee which it would have had
in the hands of the decedent.47 Such amounts would be income and
not principal if received by the decedent. There is nothing in the
statute or Congressional committee reports to indicate that Congress
intended to deny the right of the estate to a deduction for a distribu-
tion of income made taxable under Section 126(a). If there is doubt
about the right to such a deduction, the doubt should be removed by
a clarifying amendment to the statute.
Where a testator wishes to make bequests to charitable organ-
izations and. there is a possibility that at the time of his death there
will be a substantial amount of income taxable under Section 126(a),
it seems advisable, in view of the Tax Court's decisions in the Huesman
and Linde cases, to make a specific bequest to the charities of the right
to receive such income. If that is done, the income will not be includ-
ible in the return of the estate, and will be exempt from income tax 48
as well as estate tax.49
Even if the Huesman and Linde cases are correct on their facts,
they have no application to a case where an item of income in respect
of a decedent under the terms of the will is permanently set aside for
a charitable organization as part of the principal of the estate. Such
45. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
46. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103
(1932); Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333 (1929).
47. IxT. REV. CODE § 126(a) (3).
48. I T. Rzv. CODE §§126(a), 101(6).
49. INT. RIEv. CoDE §812(d).
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income, even though principal under the state law, would not be
different from capital gains realized by the estate which are considered
income permanently set aside for a charitable organization and con-
sequently deductible under Section 162 (a)." The right to the de-
duction in such cases is not dependent upon a distribution, and the
mere receipt of the income by the executor entitles the estate to the
deduction.
COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICES
Income Tax
There is no definition in the statute of the term "income
in respect of decedents," and the Congressional committee
reports on the Revenue Bill of 1942 indicate that the term was intended
to apply to income accrued to the decedent at the time of his death
which prior to the 1942 Act was includible in his final return.5' How-
ever, the courts have extended the application of Section 126 far
beyond items which could be said in any sense to have accrued to
the decedent at the time of his death or even to which the decedent
had an enforceable right. One of the most far-reaching decisions is
O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner,2 where the court held taxable to
a decedent's estate a bonus based on the decedent's services to a cor-
poration, the amount of which bonus was not determined until after
the decedent's death. Although the decedent had no enforceable right
to the bonus at the time of his death, the court said that the amount
"was plainly gross income in respect of the decedent," that the right
to receive it was acquired by the decedent's estate from the decedent,
and that consequently the amount was taxable as income to the estate
under Section 126(a).8
It was held in Varnedoe v. Allen" 4 that payments made to the
widow of a state employee constituted income to the widow as com-
pensation for personal services of the husband, where the payments
were made pursuant to a state statute and deductions were made
regularly under the statute from the husband's salary. The court said
it was not necessary that the services be rendered by the payee and
that the payments were awarded to the widow in consideration of the
50. Bowers v. Slocum, 20 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1927); G.C.M. 423, V-2 Cum.
BULL. 53 (1926); G.C.M. 10423, XI-2 Cum. BULL. 127 (1932) ; Peoples Trust Co.,
10 B.T.A. 1385 (1928) ; Potter v. Bowers, 89 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1937).
51. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942); SEN. REP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1942).
52. 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949).
53. Id. at 967-8.
54. 158 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 821 (1947).
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services rendered by her husband. Although the Varnedoe case in-
volved years when Section 126 was in force, the court did not cite
that Section but held the payments taxable under Section 22 (a), which
defines gross income. The Bureau has ruled that similar payments are
taxable to a deceased employee's estate under Section 126 (a),"' which
means that a deduction is allowable to the estate or the widow for
estate tax paid on the value of the right to receive the payments.
It seems clear that amounts paid by an employer to the estate
or the widow of a deceased employee pursuant to contract as com-
pensation for the decedent's services are taxable as income to the
recipient under Section 126(a)."' Such payments to the widow of a
deceased employee were held taxable to her even under the law in
force prior to the enactment of Section 126.57 The rule is not so
clear where the payments are voluntary and not pursuant to a con-
tractual obligation of the employer.
Bureau rulings which were in force for many years stated that
where the salary of a deceased employee was paid voluntarily to his
widow for a limited period after his death, although the employer was
entitled to deduct the payments as business expenses, they were a
gratuity to the widow and were not includible in her income. 8  The
Tax Court in Louise K. Aprill59 followed the Bureau rulings and held
that voluntary payments to a widow of a deceased employee "in
recognition of the services rendered" by her husband to the employer
were not taxable as income to her. Although the case involved a
year when Section 126 was in force, the court did not refer to that
section.
These earlier Bureau rulings were revoked or modified by I. T.
4027,6" which states that regardless of whether such payments to the
widow are voluntary or pursuant to an enforceable obligation, they
are made in consideration of services rendered by the employee and
are taxable as income to the widow. Despite that ruling, the Tax
Court in Alice M. Macfarlane 1 followed its decision in the Aprill
case and, without referring to I.T. 4027, held that such a voluntary
payment to the employee's widow was not taxable as income to her.
55. I.T. 3744, 1945 Cum. BuLL. 192.
56. See Estate of Arthur D. Davis, 11 CCH TC MEM. DEc. 814 (1952).
57. Flarsheim v. United States, 156 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1946) (involving income
for the years 1933 and 1934).
58. I.T. 3329, 1939-2 Cum. BuLL. 153; O.D. 1017, 5 Cum. BULL. 101 (1921).
59. 13 T.C. 707 (1949).
60. 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 9.
61. 19 T.C. 9 (1952).
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The Bureau's present position was upheld in Bausch's Estate v.
Commissioner,62 in which a corporation without obligation but in
accordance with past practice made payments to the estates of deceased
employees for a period of twelve months after their deaths of amounts
equivalent to the employees' salaries. It was held that the payments
were taxable as income to the respective estates under Section 126(a).
There was a decision to the same effect in a case involving a year
prior to the enactment of Section 126.'
Where the widow of a deceased employee received an amount
under a plan of the employer which provided for payments to depend-
ents of deceased employees, and the plan stated that it was a voluntary
plan and could be withdrawn at any time, but that the employer
"guaranteed" payment according to the terms of the plan in force at
the time of the employee's death, and where the amount was, deducted
by the employer as a business expense, it was held that there was an
enforceable obligation to make the payment and that the amount was
not a gift but was taxable as income to the widow for a year prior to
the enactment of Section 126.64
The Bureau has ruled that amounts received by the widow or
heirs of an employee pursuant to the terms of a voluntary death benefits
plan of any employer, to which no contributions are made by the
employee, represent compensation for services of the employee and
are taxable to the recipient under Section 126(a), even though the
employer reserves the right to designate the persons to whom the
payments are to be made. 5 The Tax Court held that a percentage
of his employer's profits for the preceding year to which a decedent
was entitled under his employment contract, but which had not been
determined during the portion of the taxable year when he was alive,
was taxable to his estate in the year of receipt and could not be con-
sidered income which was constructively received by the decedent dur-
ing his lifetime.6
Survivor Annuity :-Where an annual amount is paid to the
beneficiaries of a deceased employee under an employees' annuity plan
which qualifies under Section 165 of the Code, the amount is taxable
to the recipients in the manner and to the extent that it would have
been taxable to the employee if he had lived, and where taxed as an
62. 186 F2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951).
63. Brayton v. Welch, 39 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1941).
64. Sutro v. United States, 42-2 CCH U.S. TAx CASES 1[ 9523 (N.D. Cal. 1942).
The court said that in a separate suit for a refund of estate tax paid on the amount,
the case was dismissed and the refund made by the Government.
65. I.T. 3840, 1947-1 Cum. BULL. 7.
66. Estate of Fred Basch, 9 T.C. 627 (1947).
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annuity, the amount contributed by the employee is deemed the con-
sideration."' The income tax law was amended in 1951 to provide
that if a survivor's interest in a joint and survivor annuity contract
is includible in the decedent's gross estate under Section 811 (without
regard to whether any estate tax is payable), such interest shall be
considered property acquired from the decedent and the value of the
interest on the date of death (or optional valuation date) shall be
deemed the consideration paid for the survivor's annuity.6 This
means that of the payments received by the survivor, only three per
cent of the date of death value or other estate tax value will be taxable
as income, and the excess each year will be excluded from income until
the total of the excess equals the estate tax value. The amendment is
applicable only where the decedent died after December 31, 1950.
The Commissioner has ruled that annuities paid from retirement
funds to widows or other beneficiaries of deceased employees are
taxable under Section 22(b) (2), and not under Section 126(a), and
that no deduction is allowable for estate tax paid on the right to
receive such amounts.69  The ruling is open to question. Its reason-
ing is that Section 126 was intended to apply to items of income
which prior to the 1942 Act would have been includible in the final
income tax return of a decedent; that an annuity payable to beneficiaries
of a deceased employee would not have been includible under the
earlier statute in the decedent's final return, and that the payments
are governed exclusively by. Section 22(b) (2). As we have seen,
Section 126(a) has been applied to amounts which could not con-
ceivably have been held includible under the former statute in the
decedent's final return, 0 and Section 126(a) undoubtedly applies to
some items of income which are taxable also under subsections of
Section 22.71 The question can not be considered settled until passed
upon by the higher courts. However, it is not so important now, in
view of the 1951 amendment, referred to above, which gives the
survivor annuitant a new basis.
Where the total amount to which a beneficiary is entitled under a
qualified pension plan is paid within one taxable year to the beneficiary,
67. INT. REV. CODE §§22(b) (2), 165(b); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §§39.22(b) (2)-
5(c), 39.165-6(a) (1953).
68. Revenue Act of 1951, §303, 65 STAT. 483 (1951), amending INT. REv. CODE
§§22(b) (2) and 113(a) (5), effective for years ending after December 31, 1950.
See SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1951).
69. See 4 CCH 1947 FED. TAx REP. 6132 (Letter dated Oct. 9, 1946) (sum-
marized in 3 CCH 1953 FED. TAX REP. 1 964.40).
70. O'Daniel's Estate v. Comm'r, 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949), see text at notes
52 and 53, supra.
71. Compare Varnedoe v. Allen, 158 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 821 (1947), with I.T. 3744, 1945 Cum. BuLT. 192.
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the amount received in excess of the employee's contributions is tax-
able at capital gain rates. 7' The Bureau has ruled that the capital
gain provisions are applicable to an amount paid to a beneficiary of a
deceased employee even though the employee received payments under
the plan prior to his retirement."3 If the payments qualify as a
survivor's interest in a joint and survivor annuity, the gain would
be measured by the estate tax value of the interest.
Death Benefit Not in Excess of $5,000:--Some measure of relief
from income tax was provided by Section 302 of the Revenue Act of
1951, amending Section 22(b) (1) (B) of the Code. The amendment,
effective for 1951 and subsequent years, exempts from income tax
amounts received under a contract of an employer providing for the
payment of such amounts to the beneficiaries of an employee, paid by
reason of the death of the employee, whether in a single sum or other-
wise, with the limitation that the aggregate of the amounts excludible
from gross income of all the beneficiaries of the employee under all
such contracts of any one employer may not exceed $5,000.
It makes no difference if the payments exceed $5,000, but only
$5,000 of the aggregate payments by any one employer may be ex-
cluded from the gross income of all the beneficiaries. If the decedent
was employed by more than one employer and he had a contract
with each employer providing for such payments, the first $5,000
of such payments received by the beneficiaries from each employer
would be excludible from their gross income. The regulations 7" pro-
vide that where the aggregate payments by an employer under such
contract to the beneficiaries of the deceased employee exceed $5,000,
the $5,000 exclusion shall be apportioned among the beneficiaries in
the proportion that the amount payable to each bears to the total
death payment under the contract.
The statute does not require that the contract of the employer
be in writing. The regulations, 7 "5 however, say that there must be
an "express" contract and that such contract shall be deemed to exist
only if "(1) the employer and employee had entered into a written
contract, not revoked before the employee's death, which required such
payments or (2) the employer had an established plan (or program
having the effect of a plan) making provision for such payments in
the case of his employees generally, or for a class or classes of his
employees;" and that in the latter case the contract will be deemed
72. INT. REV. CODE § 165 (b).
73. I.T. 3847, 1947-1 Cum. BULL. 65.
74. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(b) (1)-2(a) (1953).
75. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(b)(1)-2(c) (1953).
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to exist between the employer and the employees to whom the plan
applies, provided the plan had been communicated to such employees
and had not been rescinded prior to the death of the particular deceased
employee. They provide further that a payment made on account of
the death of an employee from a pension trust exempt under Section
165 (a) shall be considered made by the employer for the purpose of
the exclusion. However, the regulations limit the exclusion to amounts
which, by the terms of the contract or the provisions of the plan,
are specifically designated as a death payment, paid only by reason
of the death of the employee; and they state that the exclusion does
not apply to amounts with respect to which the deceased employee
possessed, immediately prior to his death, a nonforfeitable right to
receive the amounts while living.
Estate Tax
Where a decedent had resigned his position as managing
trustee under a will and as an officer of corporations whose
stocks were held in the trust, in consideration of a written con-
tract providing for the payment to him of an annual sum for ten
years and providing that on his death within that period the payments
would be continued to his wife for the remainder of the period or
until her prior death, and where the decedent died within the ten
year period survived by his wife, the Tax Court held that the value
at the date of his death of the right to the remaining payments was
includible in his gross estate under Section 811(c).*7 The court
relied on cases upholding the estate tax! on the value of a survivor
annuity under a contract purchased by the decedent.77  The Tax
Court in other cases has held an amount includible in the estate of a
deceased employee under Section 811(a) or (c) where it has found
that the employee's widow had a contractual right to receive the amount
from the employer in consideration of services rendered by the em-
ployee.
78
The Bureau at one time ruled in G.C.M. 17817 " that a death
benefit paid by an employer to the beneficiary designated by a de-
ceased employee was not includible in the employee's gross estate where
the employer reserved the right to withdraw or modify the plan at
any time in reference to benefits, but guaranteed that death benefits
would be paid "in accordance with the plan as it may be in effect
76. Estate of William L. Nevin, 11 T.C. 59 (1948).
77. Comm'r v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 821
(1942) ; Mearkle's Estate v. Comm'r, 129 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1942).
78. Estate of Paul G. Leoni, 7 CCH TC MEm. DEC. 759 (1948); Estate of
Arthur W. Davis, 11 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 814 (1952).
79. 1937-1 Cum. BULL. 281.
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at the date of death of an employee." That ruling was followed in
Dimock v. Corwin. Although the case went to higher courts on
other issues, the Government did not appeal on that point.
However, the Bureau in G.C.M. 27242 81 ruled that where an
employee has the right to designate the beneficiary of a death benefit
plan to which all contributions are made by the employer, the amount
payable on the employee's death is subject to estate tax in his estate
as property owned by the decedent or as property which he transferred
reserving certain powers or interests or as property passing under the
exercise of a general power of appointment. Under the facts on which
the ruling was based, the employer reserved the right to terminate
or amend the plan, and on termination the trustee was required to pay
over to the participating employees or their beneficiaries their participat-
ing interests. The employer had the right to amend the plan so as
to eliminate the provision for payment of a death benefit on account
of employees dying prior to the receipt of any benefits under the plan,
provided the amendment did not destroy the right of an employee to
receive a death benefit which had already become payable. The ruling
modified G.C.M. 17817 and stated that Dimock v. Corwin should no
longer be followed by the Bureau.
Where it has found that death payments by an employer to the
beneficiary of a deceased employee were wholly voluntary, the Tax
Court has held that the payments are not includible in the decedent's
gross estate.82 It reached a similar conclusion in a case where a
survivor annuity was payable to the wife of a deceased employee under
an enforceable pension plan but the decedent had no right to designate
a surviving annuitant and the annuity to the decedent and his wife
was subject to reduction in amount or cancellation by the employer
in the event of various contingencies, such as unauthorized acceptance
of employment with a competitor, bankruptcy, or conviction of a
felony.' Where a deceased employee was required to contribute to a
pension fund to which the employer also contributed and it was found
that the pension plan created enforceable rights in third party bene-
ficiaries, but that the decedent at the time of his death had a vested
interest only in the return of his contributions, it was held that the
estate tax did not apply to any part of the value of an annuity paid to
his widow other than his contributions.8 4
80. 19 F. Supp. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd on other grounds, 99 F.2d 799 (2d
Cir. 1938), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1939).
81. 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 160.
82. Estate of Albert L. Salt, 17 T.C. 92 (1951) ; Estate of John C. Morrow, 19
T.C. 1068 (1953).
83. Estate of William S. Miller, 14 T.C. 657 (1950).
84. Estate of Emil L. Stake, 11 T.C. 817 (1948).
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Where an amount placed in trust by an employer as additional
compensation was to be paid to persons designated in an employee's
will, with provision for payment to his issue in default of appointment,
and the deceased employee did not make an appointment, the Tax
Court held that the amount paid on the employee's death was not
includible in his gross estate under Section 811 (c), (d) or (f), because
the decedent did not make a transfer of the amount, did not cut down
any beneficial rights which he himself had and transfer such right to
his issue, and did not make an appointment of the amount.85 The
court pointed out that the amount would have been taxable under
later statutes providing for estate tax on property over which a dece-
dent has an unexercised power of appointment.88
Higgs' Estate v. ComMissionW 17 held not includible in the
estate of a deceased employee under Section 811 (c) the value of his
wife's survivor annuity under an employer's pension plan. The dece-
dent exercised an election to receive a reduced annuity after his re-
tirement so that an annuity would be paid to his wife for life after
his death. The entire cost of the benefits was borne by the employer
and the decedent's election became irrevocable during his lifetime.
The Commissioner contended that the wife's survivor annuity was
includible in the decedent's gross estate as a transfer by the decedent
to take effect in possssion or enjoyment at or after his death and as a
transfer reserving to himself .the enjoyment for life. The Commis-
sioner relied on cases holding taxable as part of a decedent's estate
the value of the survivor's rights in a joint and survivor anihuity con-
tract purchased by the decedent. 8 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in the Higgs case said that under the 1949 amendment
of Section 811(c) relating to transfers made prior to October 8,
1949,89 a transfer made prior to that date was not taxable as one to
take effect at or after death unless the decedent had a reversionary
interest, and since there was no reversionary interest in the decedent,
the transfer was not taxable on that ground. The court found it un-
necessary to decide whether there had been a transfer by the decedent.
The court said further that the annuity contract providing the sur-
vivor benefits was purchased by the employer and not by the decedent;
85. Estate of Eugene F. Saxton, 12 T.C. 569 (1949).
86. INT. REV. CODE § 811 (f), as amended, Rev. Act of 1942, § 403, 56 STAT. 942
(1942). Section 811(f) was amended further by Pub. L. No. 58, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. (June 28, 1951), effective as of October 21, 1942, which taxes property subject
to an unexercised general power of appointment created after that date.
87. 184 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1950).
88. Comm'r v. Wilder's Estate, 118 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 634 (1941); Comm'r v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315
U.S. 821 (1942); Mearkle's Estate v. Comm'r, 129 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1942).
89. Pub. L. No. 378, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (Oct. 25, 1949).
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that the decedent had only the right to reduce his annuity in order to
provide an annuity for his wife, and that the decedent did not reserve
to himself under the instrument exercising the option an interest in
the "property" transferred to his wife.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the same
conclusion in Commissioner v. Twogood's Estate2 o on similar facts
and reasoning. There have been other decisions to the same effect by
lower courts."'
The above decisions leave open the question whether such sur-
vivor annuity would be subject to estate tax where the employee's
election is made after October 7, 1949. The Bureau ruled recently
that an employee's election prior to October 8, 1949 to take a reduced
annuity and provide a survivor annuity for his wife does not consti-
tute a taxable transfer under Section 811(c) (1) (B), but that where
the election was made on or after that date, the value of the survivor's
annuity is includible in the gross estate of the deceased employee
under Section 811(c) (3) or Section 811(f).9
2
Group Life Insurance:-The estate tax statute includes in the
gross estate of the insured proceeds of insurance policies on his life,
receivable by beneficiaries other than his estate, if the insured either ka)
paid premiums directly or indirectly or (b) has incidents of ownership
in the policies." It was held in Estate of Judson C. Welliver "4 and
in Estate of Eugene F. Saxton 9' that where a decedent's employer,
for the purpose of providing additional compensation to his em-
ployees, took out a group life insurance policy on the lives of certain
employees and the decedent received a policy for a certain amount
and part or all of the premiums were paid by the employer, the proceeds
were includible in the decedent's gross estate on the grounds that (1)
the decedent had retained the right to change the beneficiary, which
was an incident of ownership, and (2) the premiums paid by the
employer were paid indirectly by the decedent.
Optional Valuation of Survivor Annuity:-Estate of John A.
Hance " presented an interesting question of valuation of a survivor
annuity under the estate tax law. The decedent had purchased single
90. 194 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952).
91. Hanner v. Glenn, 111 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Ky. 1953); Herrick v. United
States, 108 F. Supp. 20 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Estate of M. Hadden Howell, 15 T.C. 224
(1950).
92. Rev. Rul. 158, 1953 TNT. IEv. BULL No. 17 at 18 (1953).
93. INT. REv. CODE § 811(g).
94. 8 T.C. 165 (1947).
95. 12 T.C. 569 (1949).
96. 18 T.C. 499 (1952).
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premium contracts providing for payment of an annuity to himself
for life and thereafter to his widow for her life. The executor elected
under Section 811(j) to have the assets valued one year after death.
The widow died during the one-year period and the question was
whether the loss of value due to her death should be reflected in the
value of the survivor annuity. Section 811(j) forbids any adjustment
in value "due to mere lapse of time," but it was held that the loss
of value due to the widow's death was not an adjustment due to mere
lapse of time, that such loss should be reflected in the value of the
survivor annuity and that such value was limited to the payments
actually received by the widow before her death.
PARTNERSHIP INCOME
Income Received to Date of Death
The death of a member of a partnership gives rise to a number of
interesting income and estate tax problems. One of the first prob-
lems is the income tax treatment of income received by the partnership
from the beginning of its taxable year to the date of death of a partner.
The income tax law provides that a member of a partnership
must include in his income tax return his share of the partnership
net income for its taxable year which ends within or with his taxable
yearY7 For example, if a partner files his returns on a calendar year
basis and the partnership files its returns on the basis of a fiscal year
ending June 30, the partner's return for the calendar year 1952 would
include his share of partnership income for its fiscal year ending June
30, 1952.
Where there was no provision in the partnership agreement
for continuation of the firm on the death of a partner (although
the surviving partners did in fact continue the partnership business),
it was held in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner " that the de-
ceased partner's final return should include his share of partnership
income for its fiscal year which ended within his final taxable period
and also his share of income from the beginning of the partnership's
succeeding fiscal year to the date of death. The court construed
"taxable year" as used in the statute to be synonymous with "ac-
counting period," so that if the death of a partner terminates the
partnership and consequently ends an accounting period, the dece-
dent's final return must include his share of income for such period.
If the partnership is on an accrual basis, the share of income includible
97. INT. REv. CODE § 188.
98. 303 U.S. 493 (1938).
19531
206 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
in the final return of a cash basis decedent includes his share of income
accrued to the partnership but uncollected at the time of death; but
it does not include income accrued solely by reason of death, such as
an interest in contingent fees of a law firm in uncompleted matters.99
The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits
in Girard Trust Company v. United States,"° Henderson's Estate v.
Commissioner ..' and Commissioner v. Mnookin's Estate 102 held that
where there was a provision in the partnership agreement for con-
tinuation without interruption on the death of a partner, a deceased
partner's final return was not required to include his share of partner-.
ship income to the date of death. In the Girard Trust Company case
the partnership was on a fiscal year ending June 30, and under the,
partnership agreement on the death of a partner the partnership
was to continue without interruption until the following June 30
and there was to be no accounting for profits until that time. The
decedent died November 15, 1942, and it was held that his share'
of partnership profits for the period July 1 to November 15, 1942
was not includible in his final return. The court implied that such
share of income reduced by a share of the partnership loss for the
remainder of its fiscal year was includible in the return of the decedent's
estate for the calendar year 1943. Answering the Government's
contention that partners earn income as it comes into the partnership
business, the court said: "Congress has not seen fit to tax partnership.
income as earned but rather as if each partner's earning occurred
periodically at the end of each taxable year of the partnership." 108
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Commissioner
v. Waldman's Estate 104 expressed disagreement with the decisions
in the Girard Trust Co. and Mnookin cases. The partnership agree-
ment in the Waldman case provided that on the death of a partner his
executor should have the right to continue as a partner in the business-
or to sell the decedent's partnership interest, and the executor elected
to continue in the partnership. The partnership was on a fiscal year
ending June 30 and the decedent, who died November 22, 1945, was
on a calendar year. The court, relying on Guaranty Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner,'05 held that the decedent's final return should include his
share of partnership income for the period July 1 to November 22,
99. INT. REv. CODE §42(a); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.42-1(b) (1953).
100. 182 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1950).
101. 155 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1946).
102. 184 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1950).
103. 182 F.2d at 925.
104. 196 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1952).
105. 303 U.S. 493 (1938).
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1945. The court could have distinguished the Girard Trust Company
and Mnookin cases on the ground that the partnership agreement in
each of those cases bound the estate to leave the decedent's interest
at the risk of the partnership business until the end of the fiscal year,
while in the Waldman case the executor had the option to discontinue
the decedent's interest and demand an accounting for his share of
partnership income to the date of death. However, the court, one
judge dissenting, did not choose to do so, but after citing those cases,
said: ". . . we make no attempt to distinguish them but, with
deference, reach the contrary decision which we think Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, supra, requires." '
It has been held that the death of a partner during the taxable
year does not terminate an accounting period for the surviving partners
and does not require the inclusion in their returns of partnership income
from the beginning of its fiscal year to the date of death.10 7  The
Bureau ruled recently that a change in the membership of a partner-
ship resulting from the death or withdrawal of a partner does not
in itself effect a termination of the partnership and that the returns
of a continuing partnership should continue to be filed on the basis
of the annual accounting period previously established by the partner-
ship.'08 Except as applied to partnerships which continue under the
provisions of the partnership agreement, it may be questioned whether
the Bureau ruling is in harmony with the Guaranty Trust Co. decision.
The value of the decedent's interest in the partnership, including
any accrued and uncollected income, is of course property of the
decedent which is includible in his gross estate.
If the partnership and the decedent are on a cash basis, then,
even in cases governed by the Guaranty Trust Co. case, the decedent's
share of income accrued to the partnership but uncollected at death
is not includible in the decedent's final return. Such income is tax-
able to the estate or beneficiary in the year of receipt, with a deduction
allowable for estate tax paid on the right to receive such income.'
Income Earned After Death
Where income earned by a partnership after the death of a partner
is paid to the deceased partner's estate or widow, the income and
estate tax treatment of the income depends on whether it is used
to purchase the deceased partner's interest for the surviving partners
106. 196 F.2d at 85. "
107. Mary D. Walsh, 7 T.C. 205 (1946).
108. Rev. Rul. 144, 1953 INT. REv. BuLu.. No. 8 at 29 (1953).
109. INT. REy. CODE §§126(a) and (c).
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or whether it is made pursuant to a contractual right of the estate
or widow to participate in the partnership earnings after decedent's
death as a partner, joint adventurer or otherwise, decedent's capital
interest having been purchased with other funds. In Bull v. United
States,"' the decedent was a member of a partnership in which no
capital was invested and which derived its income from personal
services. In accordance with the partnership agreement, the dece-
dent's estate was entitled to share in partnership profits and losses for
a period of one year after his death. The Commissioner contended
that the estate's share of partnership income for the one-year period
was subject to estate tax and also to income tax. It was held that
such income was subject to income tax but was not subject to estate
tax.
Treasury representatives have contended and writers on tax sub-
jects have suggested that in cases similar to the Bull case, the Com-
missioner may subject to estate tax the right to receive income for
a period after the decedent's death, as distinguished from the income
itself. Howev er, that very contention was made by the Government
in the Bull case and the court said that under the facts of that case,
it was not permissible to place any value for estate tax purposes "on
the mere right of continuance of the partnership relation inuring to
Bull's estate." "' The Court said further that the right to receive
such income was not capital to the decedent when living and could
not be such to his estate.
The Tax Court has applied the principle of the Bull case in
several cases where a share of partnership income for a period after
death was paid to a deceased partner's estate or widow pursuant to a
contractual right to share in such earnings and not as payment for
a capital interest of the decedent in the partnership.
Charles F. Coates 112 involved a partnership agreement of an
accounting firm which provided that on the death of a partner his
estate should receive payment of his capital interest in the firm and
that in addition, the estate should participate in partnership earnings,
but not losses, for a period of five years after the decedent's death. It
was held that the estate's share of income for a period after death
was not paid to purchase or liquidate the decedent's partnership in-
terest and was not taxable to the surviving partners.113
110. 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
111. Id. at 256.
112. 7 T.C. 125 (1946).
113. The author is informed that after the decision was rendered in the Coates
case the revenue authorities conceded that the right of the estate of the deceased
partner to participate in partnership earnings after the date of death was not subject
to estate tax.
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In cases involving analogous facts, it has been held that the
share of partnership income for a period after a deceased partner's
death which was paid to his estate was not taxable to the surviving
partners but was taxable as income to the deceased partner's estate. 1
Similarly, where the partnership agreement provided that on the death
of a partner the surviving partner or partners should pay to the de-
ceased partner's widow sums from the partnership income for a specified
period and it was found that the income was not used to purchase
the deceased partner's 'interest, such income was held taxable to the
widow and not to the surviving partners." 5
On the other hand, in McClennen v. Commissioner,"6 where the
partnership agreement was construed as providing that the share of
the estate of a deceased member of a law firm in partnership earnings
for a period of eighteen months after death should be applied to pur-
chase the decedent's interest for the surviving partners, it was held
that such income was subject to estate tax in the decedent's estate.
The Tax Court in its opinion in the Coates case 117 pointed out that
the McClennen case was distinguishable from the Bull case on the
ground that in the McClennen case there was a clear recognition that
each partner had a valuable capital interest in the partnership assets,
and "the effect and intent of the contract was clearly to make a sale
of such an interest to the surviving partners."
In cases where it appeared from the partnership agreement that
a share of partnership income'for a period after a partner's death was
to be applied toward the purchase of the decedent's interest for the
surviving partners, such income was held taxable to the survivors
and not to the deceased partner's estate.118
Basis of Assets to Partnership
Where remaining partners purchased the interest of a retiring
partner and by agreement continued the business without interruption
under the same firm name, it was held that the basis for computing
gain or loss on the sale of assets by the partnership remained un-
changed. 9 Similarly, where provision is made for continuation of
114. John G. Madden, 5 CCH TC MEm. DEc. 559 (1946); Richard P. Hallowell,
39 B.T.A. 50 (1939); Walter T. Gudeon, 32 B.T.A. 100 (1937).
115. Sidney Hess, 12 T.C. 773 (1949); Gussie K. Barth, 35 B.T.A. 546 (1937).
116. 131 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1942).
117. See text at note 112 supra.
118. Wilkins v. Comm'r, 161 F.2d 830 (1st Cir. 1947); W. Frank Carter, 36
B.T.A. 60 (1937) ; Estate of Bavier C. Miller, 38 B.T.A. 487 (1938) ; Hill v. Comm'r,
38 F.2d 165 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 761 (1930) ; Pope v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d
420 (1st Cir. 1930).
119. Robert E. Ford, 6 T.C. 499 (1946).
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the partnership without interruption by a partner's death or with-
drawal, it has been held that the holding period of a partner's interest
for computing capital gain on its sale runs from the time of original
acquisition and is not affected by intervening deaths of partners. 20
First National Bank of Mobile v. Commissioner'"' involved in-
come tax of the estate of a deceased member of a partnership which
continued after his death, where the estate participated in its earnings.
Although the decedent's interest in the partnership inventory was in-
cluded in the estate tax return at a value higher than its cost to the
firm, it was held that in computing the estate's share of partnership
income for the taxable year, the cost of the inventory to the firm
must be used and that the estate was not entitled to reduce its share
of income by the difference between its share of such cost and the
value at which its share of the inventory was included in the estate
tax return. It should follow that where the value of the inventory
or other partnership assets has declined, the estate is entitled to compute
its income by using the cost of such assets to the firm. This might
result in an allowable income tax loss to the estate in excess of the
value of the partnership interest for estate tax purposes.
OTHER INCOME
Gains on Sales Contracted for by Decedent
In a case which arose under the- pre-1942 statute the decedent,
who died March 24, 1938, had made an offer to sell certain patents
at a specified price, provided the offer was accepted in writing on or
before March 25, 1938. There was no acceptance and no sales agree--
ment until the latter date. The Board of Tax Appeals held that no
binding agreement was made before the decedent's death and that
the gain on the sale was not includible in the decedent's final return'221-
The Board referred with approval to the Government's contention
that if there had been a binding agreement during the decedent's life-
time, the profit would be taxable in the decedent's final return.
There is nothing in Section 126 which throws any light on the
treatment of gain represented by payments made after death on account
of a sale for which the decedent contracted during his lifetime. The
present Bureau position appears to be that gain based on the cost
of the property to the decedent is not taxable to the recipient under
Section 126 unless the sale was consummated by the decedent during
his lifetime.
120. Comm'r v. Lehman, 165 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1948).
121. 183 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. dened, 340 U.S. 911 (1951).
122. Estate of C. William Meinecke, 47 B.T.A. 634 (1942).
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The report of the Senate Finance Committee on the Revenue Bill
of 1942, in giving examples of the application of Section 126(a), makes
the following statement:
Another example is the case of a partner who con-
tracts in the partnership agreement that his interest in certain
partnership assets shall pass to the surviving partners in exchange
for payment to be made by them to his widow. On his death,
the payments by the surviving partners shall be included in the
widow's income to the extent they represent the gain on such
sale." "s
The committee report does not say whether the gain to be taxed
to the widow is to be computed by using the deceased partner's basis
for his interest.
The regulations issued under Section 126 which were in force
prior to 1945 contained the following sentences:
Furthermore, if his partnership agreement had pro-
vided for the sale to the other partners upon his death of his
right to the partnership assets in return for a payment of a certain
sum by the surviving partners to his estate, the gain on such
sale, accrued solely by reason of his death, would not be included
in computing his net income.
" . Upon his death, the payments by the surviving part-
ners must be included in the widow's income to the extent they
exceed the adjusted basis of such assets in the hands of the
decedent immediately prior to his death." 124
The above sentences were stricken from the regulations in 1945
by T.D. 5459 .21 The regulations as so amended and as now in force
contain the following example:
"Suppose that A and the decedent B were equal partners
in a business possessed of tangible assets having a present value
considerably in excess of cost; suppose that certain current part-
nership business was well advanced toward completion prior to
the death of B; and suppose that the partnership agreement pro-
vided that, upon the death of one of the partners, all partnership
assets, including unfinished business, should pass to the sur-
viving partner, and that the surviving partner should make cer-
tain payments to the estate of the decedent. To the extent that
the payments by A to the estate of B are attributable to B's in-
terest in the previously earned proportion of the unfinished part-
nership business transactions, their receipt by the estate of B
123. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. 101 (1942).
124. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.126-1 (1943).
125. 1945 Cum. BuL.. 193, amending U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.126-1 (1943).
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will reflect the realization of income. With respect to such por-
tion of the payments by A as is attributable to B's interest
in the tangible assets of the partnership which had appreciated
in value, no gain to the estate of B will be recognized. If
some portion of the payments by A is attributable to a sale of
B's interest in partnership assets consummated by B prior to his
death, however, the gain to the estate of B reflected in such pay-
ments will be recognized regardless of the character of the assets
sold, and regardless of whether or not payment was due on a day
which must occur after B's death."
The Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue in a letter dated
August 23, 1945 126 refers to the change in the regulations effected
by T.D. 5459. The letter rules that where a deceased stockholder
during his lifetime entered into a contract with the corporation or
with other stockholders in which the corporation or other stockholders
agreed to purchase and the decedent agreed that his executors would
sell his stock at book value within a specified period after his death,
the estate acquired a new basis for the stock on the decedent's death.
The ruling states that a new basis is acquired "in those cases in which
the sale is not actually consummated prior to death," that is, where the
sale is "to be effected only in the event of death."
It appears from the regulations and ruling that the position of
the Bureau now is that if the decedent during his lifetime makes an
executory contract to sell his partnership interest or other property
on his death or on some other contingency which takes place after
the date of death, the gain is not taxable as income in respect
of a decedent and the estate or legatee acquires a new basis for the
property on the decedent's death. On the other hand, where the sale
is completely consummated by the decedent during his lifetime, the
portion of the proceeds collected by the estate or legatee representing
gain to the decedent, if not taxable to the decedent during his lifetime,
would be held to constitute income or gain to the recipient,
with an allowable deduction for the estate tax paid on such gain.
It is not clear what the Bureau's position would be in a case where
the decedent during his lifetime entered into a binding contract to
sell on a certain date or on the approval of title or the preparation of
the papers and where the date falls or the acts are performed after the
date of death.117  Presumably, if the contract is one which could be
enforced by either party during the decedent's lifetime, the Bureau
would compute the gain on the basis of the decedent's cost.
126. P-H 1945 FED. TAx SRRv. 76,295 (1945).
127. See Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11 (1930).
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In Rose J. Linde 12 the decedent, who owned vineyards, had
delivered grapes to cooperative associations for conversion into wine
which was to be sold by the associations. The conversion of the grapes
into wine and the disposition of the wine did not take place until
after the decedent's death. The Commissioner contended that the
delivery of the grapes to the cooperatives constituted a sale by the
decedent during his lifetime and that proceeds of the liquidation of
the wine pools received after his death were taxable under Section 126.
The Tax Court held that no sale took place during the decedent's life-
time, that his estate acquired a new basis under Section 113(a) (5)
for its interest in the wine pools and that there was no taxable income.
Effect of 1951 Amendment Relating to Long-Term Capital
Gain:-Prior to the 1951 amendment discussed below, only 50 per
cent of the gain or loss on the sale of a capital asset held for more
than six months was taken into account in computing a taxpayer's
net capital gain or loss and net income, while 100 per cent of the gain
or loss on the sale of a capital asset held for six months or less was
so taken into account.' 29 The result was that $1 of short-term capital
loss could be applied to offset $2 of long-term capital gain. Also,
under the pre-19 5 1 law, where amounts representing net long-term
capital gain were paid to or permanently set aside for charitable organ-
izations, although only 50 per cent was taken into account in computing
net income, taxpayers claimed the right to deduct 100 per cent of
the amounts under Section 162(a). That claim was ultimately de-
cided adversely to taxpayers.'
The statute was amended by the Revenue Act of 1951 so as to
include long-term capital gains and losses in gross income at 100
per cent, to allow as a deduction 50 per cent of the excess of net
long-term capital gain over net short-term capital loss (resulting in
allowing a net long-term capital loss as a deduction in full, subject to
the limit of $1,000 as the maximum deduction allowable from ordinary
income), and to provide that where a deduction is allowable under
Section 162(a) for long-term capital gain, proper adjustment of the
deduction otherwise allowable shall be made on account of the 50 per
cent deduction allowable for the excess of net long-term capital gain
over net short-term capital loss.' 13
128. 17 T.C. 584 (1951).
129. INT. REv. CODE § 117(b).
130. United States v. Benedict, 338 U.S. 692 (1950).
131. Revenue Act of 1951, § 322, 65 STAT. 499 (1951), amending INT. REv. CoDE
§§117(b) and (c) and 162(a) (effective for taxable years beginning on or after
October 20, 1951).
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Even though Section 126(b) allows as a deduction to the estate
or legatee only the deductions in respect of a decedent covered by
Section 23(a), (b) and (c), since the section dealing with the deter-
mination of capital gain and loss allows a deduction for 50 per cent
of the excess of net long-term capital gain over net short-term capital
loss, it seems clear that a taxpayer who is required to include in gross
income such excess net long-term capital gain in respect of a decedent
is entitled to the same 50 per cent deduction to which the decedent
would have been entitled. It is not clear whether such taxpayer would
be required to reduce the excess net long-term capital gain in respect
of a decedent by his own net short-term capital loss in order to arrive
at the amount to which the 50 per cent deduction is applicable.
The allowance of 50 per cent of a net long-term capital gain as an
income tax deduction, instead of eliminating from income 50 per cent
of such gain, would make no difference in the amount of the estate
tax attributable to the gain, since the full amount of the gain would
be subject to estate tax. However, since the allocation of the estate
tax to the taxable years of the estate or legatee is based on gross
income in respect of a decedent, and not net income, the changed treat-
ment would make a difference in the proration of the deduction for
estate tax to the years in which items of income in respect of a dece-
dent are received by the estate or legatee.
Gain on Installment Obligations
Where a decedent during his lifetime has elected to report gain
on the sale of property on the installment basis under Section 44 of
the Code, the decedent's death effects a transmission or realization of
all unpaid installment obligations, resulting in the inclusion in the dece-
dent's final return of all gain represented by such obligations.'3  The
taxable gain in such cases is the fair market value of the obligations
less the unrecovered basis. However, such gain may be excluded
from the decedent's final return if there is filed with the Commissioner
at the time prescribed in the regulations a bond conditioned upon the
return as income, by the person receiving any payment of such obliga-
tions, of the gain on each payment which would be reportable by the
decedent if he had lived and received such payment."' The regula-
tions require that the bond be filed by the fiduciary, next of kin or
legatee at the time of filing the return for the decedent for the year
of his death or at such later time as may be specified by the Commis-
132. INT. REv. CODE § 44(d).
133. Ibid.
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sioner.3 4 Thus, the executor or other person entitled to receive
payment of installment obligations has the option of doing nothing, in
which event the gain represented by the unpaid installment obligations
will be includible in full in the decedent's final return, or of giving
a bond in proper form, so that the gain will be taxable to the estate
or other person.
The gain on such unpaid installment obligations is governed
by the provisions of the statute relating to installment obligations, and
not by Section 126(a), so that the gain will be taxable on the dece-
dent's final return unless the required bond is given. However, if the
bond is given, the person receiving payment of the installment obliga-
tions may be entitled under Section 126(c) to a deduction for the
amount of estate tax attributable to the gain represented in such obliga-
tions. Section 126(a) allows such deduction to a person !'who
includes an amount in gross income" under Section 126(a), and it
could be said that the giving of the required bond results in the
classification of such gain as gross income in respect of a decedent
under Section 126(a). This point is not covered by the regulations
or rulings and has not been passed upon by the courts.
Goldberg's Estate v. Commissioner ..5 involved the final income
tax return of a decedent who was a member of a partnership which
had unreported profits on unpaid installment obligations. The executor
contended that the installment obligations could not have been trans-
mitted by the decedent's death, because they were owned by the part-
nership and not by the decedent. It was held that the decedent's death
resulted in a transmission of his share of such obligations and that
since no bond was given, his share of the gain was includible in his
final return. The court cited Waddell v. Commissioner,'36 in which
there was a similar holding.
Long-Term Compensation
If at least 80 per cent of the total compensation for personal services
covering a period of thirty-six or more calendar months is received or
accrued in one taxable year by an individual or partnership, then, under
the provisions of Section 107(a) of the Code, the tax attributable to any
part of such compensation which is included in the gross income of an
individual shall not be greater than the aggregate of the taxes at-
tributable to such part if it had been included in the individual's
gross income ratably over that part of the period which preceded the
134. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.44-5 (1953).
135. 189 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1951).
136. 102 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1939).
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date of receipt or accrual. The regulations state that it is not neces-
sary, in order for those provisions to apply, that the individual who
includes the compensation in gross income be the person who ren-
dered the services, and as an example they say that a partner who
shares in the compensation for such services rendered by a partner-
ship is entitled to the benefits of Section 107(a) .1
Because of the provisions of Section 126(a) (3) that the right
to receive an amount of income in respect of a decedent shall have
the same character in the hands of the estate or legatee that it would
have had in the hands of the decedent, it seems clear that 'where the
decedent during his lifetime received 20 per cent or less of such long-
term compensation and the balance is received by his estate or legatee in
one taxable year, the estate or legatee is entitled to the benefits of Section
107 (a). A question which the statute and regulations leave unanswered
is whether the tax payable by the estate or legatee on receiving the com-
pensation is limited by the tax which the decedent would have paid
on the compensation if he had received it ratably over the period
during which the services were rendered or whether the tax is
limited by that which would have been so payable on the compensation
by the estate or legatee.
Section 126 (a) (3) provides that the right to receive an item
of income in respect of a decedent shall be treated in the hands of the
estate or legatee as if it had been acquired in the transaction in which
the decedent acquired such right, and that provision lends weight
to the argument that the tax may be computed by reference to the
prior income of the estate or legatee, and not that of the decedent. The
fact that the estate was not in existence in the prior periods or that
no returns were filed by the estate or legatee for the prior periods
would not impair that argument.
The congressional committee reports on the Revenue Bill of
1942 make the following statement:
If the amounts are compensation for personal services
rendered over a period of 36 months, and would be within the
provisions of section 107 if the decedent lived and included such
amounts in his gross income, section 107 applies. That is, the
tax of the person including this amount in gross income attribut-
able to the inclusion of such amount in his income shall not
exceed the aggregate of the taxes of the decedent which would be
attributable to such amount if it had been received by the dece-
dent in equal portions in each of the months included in the
period in which the personal services were rendered." 138
137. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.107-1 (1953).
138. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 85-86 (1942) ; SaFr. REP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1942).
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That statement indicates an intention of Congress that the tax be
computed by reference to the decedent's income for the years in which
the services were rendered.
Prior to their amendment in 1944, the regulations contained
language substantially identical with the language used in the com-
mittee reports." 9 The regulations were amended in 1944 by striking
out that language and inserting in its place a sentence which states:
If the amounts received would be subject to special treatment
under Section 107 if the decedent had lived and included such amounts
in his gross income, Section 107 applies." 14
There is no record of the reason for the amendment. It is argu-
able from the amendment that the tax payable on such compensation
when received by the estate or legatee may be computed on the basis
of the income of the estate or legatee for the period in which the
services were rendered.
Interest
Interest accrued but unpaid at the time of death is includible in
the income of the estate or legatee under Section 126(a) in the year
of receipt. The regulations provide that the statutory provisions
apply to the entire increment accruing on certain United States
Treasury bonds and not includible in the decedent's income, where the
bonds were owned by the decedent and registered in the names of him-
self and another as co-owner or beneficiary.
141
The Tax Court has held that interest on United States Treasury
G Bonds accrued to a decedent at the time of his death is not includible
in his gross estate because, although the bonds are redeemable on death
at face value, no interest is payable unless the bonds are held on the
interest payment date. 42
Dividends
In a case which arose under the pre-1942 law, the Supreme Court
held that dividends declared prior to death payable to stockholders
of record on a date after death were not includible in the final income
tax return of a deceased stockholder as income accrued at death. 43
It would follow under the present law that where a decedent's estate
139. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.126-1 (1943) (last paragraph).
140. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.126-1 (1943) (last paragraph), as amended, T.D.
5389, 1944 Cum. BULL. 196.
141. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.126(a)-1 (1953).
142. Estate of Willis L. King, Jr., 18 T.C. 414 (1952).
143. Estate of Putnam v. Comm'r, 324 U.S. 393 (1945).
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receives a dividend declared prior to death and the record date is after
death, although the dividend is taxable as income to the estate, no
income tax deduction is allowable for estate tax paid on the right to
receive the dividend. The dividend is reflected in the value of the
stock and is not income in respect of a decedent. But where the
record date is prior to death and the dividend is received by the estate
or legatee, the dividend is valued separately for estate tax purposes and




The Bureau has ruled that where a trust has a fiscal year ending
after the date of death of the income beneficiary, the beneficiary's
final return must include his distributable share of net income received
by the trust up to the date of death, and that any trust income accrued
but uncollected by the trustee at the time of death which is paid to
the decedent's estate is taxable to the estate under Section 126 in the
year of receipt. 45 The ruling finds support in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
Commissioner ' 46 dealing with the taxation of partnership income on
the death of a partner.
Trustee's Commissions
It has been held that where a decedent during his lifetime has
earned commissions as trustee, and the commissions are awarded by
the state court and paid to his estate after death, they constitute income
to the estate under Section 126 in the year of payment. 147  This is
true even though the decedent had no right to receive the commissions
until they were awarded by the state court.
Insurance Agent's Renewal Commissions
It has been generally assumed that where the estate or legatee of
a deceased insurance agent has obtained a right to receive amounts
representing commissions on premiums paid on the renewal after
death of policies written by the agent during his lifetime, the value
of such right is an asset which is subject to estate tax in the decedent's
144. See Mable C. Roe, 15 T.C. 503, 510 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, sub
nom. Roe v. Comm'r, 192 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1951).
145. Letter dated February 6, 1947, reported in 1951-52 MONTGOMERY, ESTATES,
TRUSTS AND GinTs 246.
146. See text at note 98 supra.
147. Estate of Fred Basch, 9 T.C. 627 (1947).
TAXATION OF INCOME OF DECEDENTS
estate. Decisions of the Tax Court in Estate of Thomas F. Reming-
ton 14 and Estate of Boyd C. Taylor 149 hold that amounts received
by the decedent's estate on account of such renewal commissions are
subject to income tax under Section 126(a), but they throw doubt
on whether any amount is subject to estate tax on account of the
right to receive such commissions.
In the Remington case the decedent, a broker engaged in selling
insurance other than life insurance, had an arrangement with an in-
surance' brokerage firm whereby he would receive one-half of the
commissions on the renewal of policies of customers obtained by him
and that on his death the same share of such renewal commissions
would be paid to his estate. After the decedent's death his executors
purported to sell the decedent's "insurance brokerage business" to the
firm in consideration of the payment of one-half of the net commissions
received from his customers for a period of approximately six years
after his death. It was contended on behalf of the estate that amounts
which it received from the firm under such arrangement were exempt
from income tax as property received by bequest or inheritance. The
Tax Court held such amounts taxable as income to the estate under
Section 126. The court relied chiefly on Bull v. United States,18
which held that a share of partnership earnings received by a deceased
partner's estate for a period after death was subject to income tax and
not to estate tax. The Tax Court said that, just as in the Bull case,
Remington had no investment in the business, the payments to the
estate were payments of income, and the mere transfer from the dece-
dent to his estate was no more sufficient to create a basis for the
value of his business than was true in the Bull case. The court said
further: ". . . we do not have here any interest in a business
possessed of tangible assets which would permit us to regard such an
interest as a capital asset." 151
In the Taylor case the decedent at the time of his death was a
member of a partnership engaged principally in marine insurance under-
writing. The partnership agreement gave the decedent's estate an
option to become a partner with the other partners to engage in the
same type of business for a period of 2,831 days. The estate exercised
the option and a new partnership was formed. During the years
1944 and 1945 the estate received approximately $40,000 and $31,500
as its share of partnership income and not as payment for any share
148. 9 T.C. 99 (1947).
149. 17 T.C. 627 (1951), aff'd per curian., 200 F2d 561 (6th Cir. 1952).
150. See text at note 110 supra.
151. 9 T.C. at 107.
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which the decedent may have had in assets of the partnership. The
option to participate in the partnership was included in the estate tax
return at a value of $140,000 and the estate as petitioner claimed a
deduction each year for depreciation arrived at by spreading $140,000
over a period of 2,831 days. The Tax Court held the deduction not
allowable, saying:
" . the ruling of the Supreme Court in Bull v. United States,
295 U. S. 247, stands as a barrier to the allowance. In order to
sustain petitioner we-would be obliged to find that this right held
by petitioner constituted a capital asset which it received from
the decedent. We are unable to make such a finding.
We hold that the right inuring to petitioner to receive
decedent's share of the partnership income was not capital. Since
this right does not constitute capital, petitioner is not entitled to
any depreciation thereon." I"'
It is probable that the decisions in the Remington and Taylor
cases will lead to litigation involving the question whether any amount
is includible in the gross estate of a deceased insurance agent on
account of the right of his estate or a legatee to participate in com-
missions paid on the renewal of policies after the date of death.
Minimization of Income Tax:-It seems clear that all amounts
received by the estate or legatee of a deceased insurance agent on
account of renewal commissions or a share of the earnings of a
partnership receiving such commissions are taxable as income to the
estate or legatee under Section 126(a). If the value of the right to
receive such commissions or to participate in the partnership earnings
is subject to estate tax, an income tax deduction for the estate tax
will be allowable under Section 126(c). Ordinarily, the greater part
of such commissions will be received by the estate or legatee within the
first two or three years after the decedent's death, resulting in their
falling into high income tax brackets. The tax on such amounts
would be minimized if the decedent during his lifetime should make an
arrangement with the insurance company or the partnership which
would provide for payment of a specified amount on account of such
commissions to his estate or legatee over a period of years longer than
the period in which such payments would be made in the absence of
an agreement. Income tax savings may be effected also by be-
queathing to more than one taxpayer the right to receive fractional
portions of the renewal commissions.
152. 17 T.C. at 630.
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Alimony
Arrearages of alimony which would have been taxable as income
to a divorced wife if received during her lifetime, to which she had
an enforceable right and which were paid to her estate after death have
been held to constitute taxable income to the estate under Section 126.'
Accounts Receivable
Where a decedent at the time of his death owned accounts re-
ceivable which would have been taxable in full as income to him if
collected during his lifetime, it was held that the proceeds of the
sale of such accounts by his estate were taxable as income to the
estate under Section 126.'15 The Government conceded that amounts
received by the estate on the sale of inventory property were not
income to the estate but were a return of capital.
Crops and Raised Livestock
In a case where a decedent died owning raised cattle and feed
and the expense of raising them had been deducted on his income tax
returns, but there had been no sale or contract to sell, it was held under
the pre-1942 law that their value was not includible as accrued income
in the decedent's final return. 55 It should follow under the present
law that crops and raised livestock which have no cost to the decedent
take as their basis to the estate or legatee their value for estate tax
purposes, that Section 126 does not apply and that only the excess
realized on a sale constitutes taxable income or gain.'5 6
CONCLUSION
Many important problems involving taxation of income attribut-
able to decedents have been decided in the past eleven years by the
lower and appellate courts. A number of other problems, resulting
from the vague and uncertain language of the statutes and changes in
their interpretation by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, remain un-
153. Estate of Sarah L. Narischkine, 14 T.C. 1128 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 189
F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1951).
154. Dixon v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. Ky. 1950), aff'd per curiam,
192 F2d 82 (6th Cir. 1951).
155. Estate of Tom L. Burnett, 2 T.C. 897 (1943).
156. See INT. REv. CODE § 117 (j), as amended by Revenue Act of 1951, § 323 (a),
65 STAT. 500 (1951), which provides in substance that if an unharvested crop on land
used in the taxpayer's trade or business and held for more than six months and the
land itself are sold at the same time and to the same person, the gain on the sale
of the crop is taxable as capital gain. Since the estate or legatee would acquire a
new basis for the crop and land on the decedent's death, the estate or legatee must
hold them for more than six months in order to obtain the benefit of that provision.
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solved. In the absence of clarifying amendments, it will be several
years before all major problems arising under these statutes have
been settled by the higher courts. Some of the more important prob-
lems would be eliminated and the statute made to operate more equit-
ably if Section 126 were amended to accomplish the following results:
(1) Define income and deductions "in respect of a decedent."
(2) Provide that no income "in respect of a decedent" shall be
taxable to the decedent's estate or legatee unless there is a contractual
right to receive such income.
(3) Allow a credit, instead of a deduction, for the estate tax
on the income tax return, or, in the alternative, make it clear that
the income tax payable by the estate or legatee shall be taken into
consideration in arriving at the value of such income for estate tax
purposes.
(4) Make it clear that any amount includible in the income of
an estate under Section 126 may be taken as a deduction under Sec-
tion 162(c) if distributed currently to a beneficiary.
(5) Provide that the death of a legatee does not require the
inclusion in the legatee's final return of the uncollected portion of the
income and that such portion shall be taxed to the legatee's estate
or beneficiaries in the years in which received by them.
